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Abstract—Users of electronic devices, e.g., laptop, smartphone,
etc. have characteristic behaviors while surfing the Web. Profiling
this behavior can help identify the person using a given device.
In this paper, we introduce a technique to profile users based on
their web transactions. We compute several features extracted
from a sequence of web transactions and use them with one-
class classification techniques to profile a user. We assess the
efficacy and speed of our method at differentiating 25 synthetic
users on a benchmark dataset (from a major security vendor)
representing 6 months of web traffic monitoring from a small
enterprise network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modeling network communication patterns has several ap-
plications including intrusion detection [12], bot detection [4]
and identification of running applications on a device [2].
While network traffic monitoring has also been used to profile
host communications [3], [5], [13], little attention has been
given to profiling a specific user based on the network traffic
she generates. The few existing techniques [3], [8], [11] use
coarse-grained features of communication such as IP flow
records. Thus, they require a long period of traffic monitoring
to reliably identify the communicating user, which limits their
application.
A system able to quickly identify if a known user is using
a given device can have many applications such as continuous
authentication or intrusion monitoring. In these scenarios,
when the system detects user behavior that is inconsistent with
previously seen behavior, an administrator is alerted (intrusion
monitoring) or the user is automatically logged out (continuous
authentication).
The patterns of behavior of people as they access various
Internet sites are likely to be consistent over time for a given
user while being different from one user to another. Based on
this assumption, we conjecture that a person can be identified
by profiling his/her web transactions. A web transaction is a
sequence of HTTP requests and responses to a single URL.
We introduce a feature extraction method applied to sequences
of web transactions. We extract these features from historical
logs of web transactions to build a user-specific profile using
one-class classification algorithms: OC-SVM and SVDD. We
use an optimization method to compute the best parameters
for building these models. In contrast to state-of-the-art user
profiling solutions [3], [11] relying on IP flows, we use
web transaction logs augmented with information about the
requested service, i.e. website category, application type, etc.,
to build our user profiles. Thus, our profiles are more specific
enabling quick user identification within a few minutes.
Contributions: We introduce a novel feature extraction and
modeling technique to profile users from their web transac-
tions (Sect. III). We evaluate our profiling technique with a
benchmark dataset provided by a major security vendor. The
dataset consists of logs collected from 25 synthetic users over a
period of 6 months (Sect. IV). The vendor uses this dataset for
comparative evaluation of commercial user profiling solutions.
Our preliminary results show that our technique can identify
a user accurately (90%) and quickly (<5 minutes) (Sect. V).
II. ONE-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
We use two one-class classification methods that try to
separate normal transactions of a user (provided as input)
from unusual ones (which are unknown) by creating a binary
function. The objective of this function is to accept (most of)
the transactions of the user for whom it was trained, while
rejecting transactions of others. These methods are described
using the following prerequisites.
Given input:
x1, · · · , xl ∈ X (1)
where l ∈ N is a number of input samples and xi ∈ R
n. Let
Φ be a feature mapping X → F where F is an inner product
space where the inner product can be computed by a kernel
function k e.g. Linear kernel, Sigmoid kernel, etc. [9]:
x, y ∈ X, k(x, y) = Φ(x) · Φ(y), k(x, y) = e−‖x−y‖
2/C (2)
where C is a predefined constant.
A. One-Class Support Vector Machines (OC-SVMs)
OC-SVMs is an unsupervised algorithm to find the best
separating hyperplane that splits the data into two regions:
one with high probability density of data, where the most data
lies, and the other with the rest. We consider a version of the
algorithm that allows setting ν, an upper bound on the fraction
of outliers (training points not accepted by the model) and
a lower bound on the fraction of support vectors [9]. Basic
concepts of the method are briefly presented following the
original notation.
To get a support of high-dimensional distribution we need
to solve the following primal problem:
argmin
w∈F,ξ∈Rl,ρ∈R
1
2
‖w‖2+
1
νl
∑
i
ξi − ρ
subject to (w · Φ(xi)) ≥ ρ− ξi, ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , l (3)
We are optimizing a hyperplane w which separates the data
into two spaces with a margin at least ρ. In case of non-linearly
separable data, there is a slack variable ξ, which enables some
of the training points to have a smaller margin than ρ. When
ξi is positive, the margin of the point is lower than ρ. The sum
of slacks should be minimized, it favors thus well separated
hyperplane solution.
The decision function for the primal problem is:
f(xi) = sgn((w · Φ(xi))− ρ) (4)
While non-zero slack variables ξi are penalized (outliers are
penalized), we can expect that the most input data points xi
will have a decision function value f(xi) ≥ 0.
We do not directly search a mapping Φ in which our data
would be linearly separable but consider the following dual
problem using kernels:
argmin
α
1
2
∑
ij
αiαjk(xi, xj)
subject to 0 ≤ αi ≤
1
νl
,
∑
i
αi = 1, i = 1, · · · , l (5)
and its decision function:
f(x) = sgn
(∑
i
αik(xi, x)− ρ
)
(6)
All the points satisfying αi > 0 are called support vectors
and the primal problem hyperplane can be reconstructed as a
linear combination of these support vectors:
w =
∑
i
αiΦ(xi) (7)
B. Support Vector Data Description (SVDD)
SVDD is similar to OC-SVMs, though it tries to split the
data into two regions by encapsulating the majority of the data
in a hypersphere instead of separating it with a hyperplane. A
hypersphere is defined by a center a and a radius R > 0. The
volume of the hypersphere is minimized by minimizing R2
and the condition that the hypersphere contains most of the
training data xi. To allow disregarding part of the training data
from the hypersphere there are added slack variables ξi ≥ 0
and the weight C [10].
The task is to solve the following problem:
argmin
R∈R,ξ∈Rl,a∈F
R2 + C
l∑
i=1
ξi
subject to ‖Φ(xi)− a‖
2≤ R2 + ξi, ξi ≥ 0 (8)
The parameter C controls the number of data points lying
outside the hypersphere and is related to ν in OC-SVM as
C = 1νl . When the problem is solved and the center a and
radius R are computed, a tested instance x is detected as an
outlier if:
‖Φ(x)− a‖2> R2 (9)
The dual problem using kernels is given by:
argmax
α∈Rl
l∑
i=1
αik(xi,xi)−
l∑
i,j
αiαjk(xi,xj)
subject to 0 ≤ αi ≤ C,
l∑
i=1
αi = 1 (10)
and the squared radius R2 and decision function f(x) are
computed by:
R2 = k(xSV ,xSV )−2
l∑
i=1
αik(xi,xSV )+
l∑
i,j
αiαjk(xi,xj)
(11)
(12)
f(x) = sgn

R2 −∑
i,j
αiαjk(xi, xj)
+ 2
∑
i
αik(xi, x)− k(x, x)


Support vectors are input vectors xi satisfying αi > 0. Any
support vector xSV satisfying 0 < αSV < C can be used for
the calculation of R2.
The algorithm implementations used in this paper are ν-
OC-SVM and SVDD from [1].
III. PROFILING USERS
A. Data
The data used for analysis is in the form of web transaction
logs created by a secure proxy logging all user web activities.
This service augments the logs with additional proprietary
information, e.g. website reputation, website category, applica-
tion type, etc. The logs include various information including
time-stamp, requested URL, protocol, HTTP action, user-id,
etc. Here is a partial example of a logged web transaction:
2015-05-29 05:05:04, www.inlinegames.com,
HTTP/1.0, GET, user_9, Games, text/html,...
Out of these logs we consider the following fields:
• HTTP-action: GET, POST, CONNECT or HEAD.
• uri-scheme: HTTP or HTTPS.
• category: a description of the content pointed by the target
URL, e.g., Restaurants, Phishing, Messaging, etc.
• media type: a description of the target resource, e.g.,
video/mp4, text/plain, audio/wav, etc.
• application type: the application running on the target
resource, e.g., Rhapsody, CloudFlare, Speedyshare, etc.
• reputation: reputation of the URL given by the logging
service, i.e. Minimal/Medium/High Risk or Unverified.
B. Extracting features from web transactions
A feature representation is adopted to use web transactions
logs with OC-SVMs and SVDD. Http-action, uri-scheme, cat-
egory, media type and application type fields are represented
as bag-of-words features. Bag-of-words is a simple represen-
tation transforming nominal data into numerical matrix form.
For each value taken by a field of the log file, e.g. http-action,
we create a binary feature to represent its presence (1) or
absence (0) in a given web transaction. For example, for the
http-action field, four binary features are created namely GET,
POST, CONNECT and HEAD. Media type is split into two
new fields: super-type and sub-type, each subjected to a bag-
of-words feature representation e.g.:
video/mp4 -> super-type:video, sub-type:mp4
In addition, we create the following features. The reputation
field is allocated to two features. Not all URL have a verified
reputation, the first feature is a binary feature having the value
1 for a verified reputation and 0 for unverified. The second is
a numerical value mapping the risk: Minimal = 0, Medium =
0.5 and High = 1. If the reputation is unverified, this second
feature is set to the default value Minimal = 0. One feature
represents if the target destination of a transaction is public (0)
or private (1) i.e. internal network requests. A partial example
representation of a feature vector is:
CONNECT|HTTP|reputation|verified|Messaging|..
1 1 0 1 0
C. Feature vector composition
We consider aggregated sequences of transactions for mod-
eling. We seek to reveal underlying time or order dependent
structures by aggregating transactions into time windows. We
use windows moving in time by a fixed shifting factor S
seconds and having a duration D seconds such that S ≤ D. A
window represents the transactions occurring during the period
D. All transactions belonging to a window are aggregated into
one feature vector. Binary features in transactions within a
window are aggregated using a logical disjunction. Numerical
features are aggregated as an average over the values from
windowed transactions. The windowing is user- (user-id) or
host- (source IP address) specific: only transactions from one
user/host are aggregated in a given feature vector. In the
following example we assume a set of transactions belonging
to one window:
CONNECT|HTTP|reputation|verified|Messaging|..
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0.5 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
They are transformed into one feature vector:
CONNECT|HTTP|reputation|verified|Messaging|..
1 1 0.167 0.667 0
D. Feature vector usage
Each user-specific feature vector resulting from the compo-
sition discussed above represents an input sample xi ∈ X for
learning an OC-SVM or SVDD model specific to this user, as
described in Sect. II. For testing purposes, the windowing can
be user- or host-specific. User-specific windowing is used to
assess the accuracy of a learned model and its capability to
accept future transactions from the profiled user and to reject
transactions from other users. Host-specific windowing is used
for real applications where we need to identify the user using
a given device.
IV. DATASET AND LEARNING PARAMETERS SETTING
A. Dataset
Our dataset was provided by a major security vendor who
uses it as a benchmark dataset for evaluation of commercial
user profiling solutions. This dataset represents 6 months of
web transaction logs generated programmatically in a small
enterprise network. It contains 9,450,474 web transactions of
36 users on 35 different devices. Each device was used by 3
users on average (number of different devices used by a single
user ranged between 1 and 17). First, we filtered out users
who had fewer than 1,500 transactions, as not representative
enough, and kept 25 users having from 2,514 to 4,678,488
transactions each. The median transaction count per user is
38,910. Extracting the bag-of-words features from the dataset
gives a feature vector containing 843 columns described in
Tab. I.
B. Consistency of user transactions over time
For profiling users, we assume that web transactions of a
given user will be consistent over time and any changes are
gradual. Thus, we conjecture that by modeling transactions
observed over a sufficient period of time, we can determine if
new transactions are likely performed by a profiled user or not.
To validate this assumption, we estimate the temporal novelty
in the behavior of each user as follows. We choose a point in
time t as the epoch delimiter to divide the transactions of a
user into two sets: observed transactions that happened before
t and subsequent transactions that would take place after t. We
then attempt to quantify the novelty contained in subsequent
transactions with respect to the observed transactions.
TABLE I
FEATURE VECTOR COMPOSITION
Feature category Count
http action 4
uri scheme 2
public address flag 1
reputation 1
reputation verified 1
category 105
supertype 8
subtype 257
application type 464
Total 843
First, we select the three
largest feature categories
(cf. Tab. I): application type
(464), subtype (257) and
category (105). We compute
the ratio of features from
each category present in
subsequent transactions
that are not in observed
transactions. This novelty
ratio represents the extent of
the evolution in user behavior
with respect to the dominant
feature categories. Figure 1
depicts the evolution of this novelty ratio for 25 users while
increasing t from 1 to 21 weeks. Already after one week
of observation, there is only 25% novel media types in the
remaining of subsequent transactions while this ratio is lower
than 10% for application types and website categories. The
novelty ratio decreases as the length of the observation epoch
increases to quickly reach a low value of 5%, showing that
users exhibit little novelty over time in their web transactions.
It is important to note that the reduction in novelty does
indeed correspond to consistency in user behavior because
the feature space covered by individual users over time is
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Fig. 1. Novelty ratio (mean and variance) for 25 users over 20 weeks for the
three largest feature categories.
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Fig. 2. Novelty ratio (mean and variance) for 25 users over 20 weeks
considering transaction windows.
very low. The average counts of observed features per user
over their whole transactions are:
• category: 17.84/105
• subtype: 17.12/257
• application type: 19.08/464
Second, we evaluate the novelty in transaction windows for
each user. We build two sets of feature vectors computed from
transaction windows: one from the observed set and one from
the subsequent set. Then, we compute the ratio of feature
vectors from the subsequent set that are not present in the
observed set. This evaluation is more specific than the previous
since feature vectors from the subsequent set are considered
as novelty if they are not strictly equal to one feature vector
from the observed set. Fig. 2 depicts the evolution of this
novelty ratio over the 25 users while increasing the observation
period from 1 to 21 weeks. The evolution of novelty is in this
case similar to that in Fig. 1 after a week of observations, the
novelty ratio with respect to transaction windows is 25%.
These experiments show that user web transaction are
consistent and exhibit little novelty over time. Thus, they can
be modeled using our feature representation to profile users.
Considering the decrease of the novelty ratio over time, we
choose to use the 75% oldest transactions from each user as
training set for parameter optimization and learning purposes.
The remaining 25% of the transactions is used as testing set.
C. Optimization of learning parameters
To build classification models able to efficiently differen-
tiate users, we perform a grid search to find the optimum
learning parameters. The window duration D, the shifting
factor S (Sect. III-C), the classification model kernel and the
parameters ν, C for OC-SVM, SVDD respectively (Sect. II),
are tested in this procedure. We evaluate the quality of a
user model along two criteria. First, the model must accept
web transactions by the user the model was learned from i.e.
the profiled user. The ratio of accepted transaction windows
from the profiled user is called self-acceptance ratio, denoted
ACCself , and must be maximized. Second, the model must
reject web transactions performed by others. The ratio of
accepted transaction windows from other users is called other-
acceptance ratio, denoted ACCother , and must be minimized.
The optimization problem results in maximizing the global-
acceptance ratio, ACC = ACCself − ACCother , for each
user.
Feature vectors are computed from the training set fol-
lowing the user-specific windowing technique presented in
Sect. III-C. OC-SVM and SVDD classification models are
learned for each user and each combination of the learning
parameters. The values considered for window durationD and
shifting factor S are column headers in Tab. II. The kernels and
ν, C parameter values for model learning are column headers,
row headers respectively, in Tab. III. The window duration D
and shifting factor S are globally optimized for all users, while
the kernel and ν, C parameters are optimized per user.
Table II provides an excerpt of the window duration and
shift grid search for an SVDD model. ACCself was computed
using the same transaction windows as for learning the model
and ACCother using all other 24 users training sets. All
acceptance values ACCx are averages of the 25 user results.
We retained a window duration D = 60s and a shifting factor
S = 30s for the rest of the experiments. While these values
do not provide the best global acceptance (ACC = 79.5% for
D = 10m and S = 1m), they provide the best self-acceptance
(ACCself = 93.3%), which is desirable to maximize user
identification. In addition, keeping a low window duration and
shift speeds up user identification since fewer time is needed
to compute a window that would be accepted by the model.
It is worth noting that the selected shifting factor S = 30s
provides an overlap of 30 seconds between two consecutive
windows and enables to compute a new feature vector every
30 seconds.
Table III presents the grid search on SVDD model param-
eters for user1. The previously selected parameters D = 60s
and S = 30s are the only considered for this part of the
optimization process, which is performed individually for each
user. A linear kernel with C = 0.4 provides the maximum
user18
user1
user21
user3
user23
user24
user5
Time (minutes)
100800 604020
predicted usage
actual usage
Fig. 3. Transaction windows actually performed (big squared dots) by 3 users
on a single device over 100 minutes. 7 out of our 25 user models accepted
transaction windows (small dots) over the 100 minutes of monitoring.
global-acceptance ratio ACC = 95.4%. These values are thus
selected to build SVDD model for user1.
TABLE II
EXCERPT OF GRID SEARCH RESULTS FOR WINDOW DURATIOND AND
SHIFTING FACTOR S . THE RESULTS ARE FOR SVDD, C = 0.5 AND A
linear KERNEL. RETAINED VALUES ARE D = 60s AND S = 30s.
Window duration (D) 60s 60s 5m 10m 30m 60m
Shifting factor (S) 6s 30s 1m 1m 5m 5m
ACCself 91.1 93.3 90.1 90.9 87.6 83.6
ACCother 17.2 15.8 12.7 11.4 9.6 8.6
ACC 73.8 77.5 77.3 79.5 77.9 75.0
TABLE III
GRID SEARCH RESULTS (ACC ) ON SVDD KERNEL AND C PARAMETER
FOR user1 . D = 60s AND S = 30s ARE FIXED. A linear KERNEL AND
C = 0.4 ARE RETAINED TO BUILD SVDD MODEL FOR user1 .
C \ kernel Linear Polynomial RBF Sigmoid
0.999 94.4 0.0 43.6 85.6
0.99 94.4 0.0 43.6 85.6
0.95 94.4 0.0 43.6 85.6
0.9 94.4 0.0 43.6 85.6
0.8 94.4 0.0 43.6 85.6
0.7 94.2 0.0 42.3 29.4
0.6 51.6 0.0 94.1 85.1
0.5 94.4 -28.6 43.6 85.6
0.4 95.4 7.7 94.0 85.5
0.3 51.5 4.7 43.6 15.7
0.2 94.2 -28.2 94.2 32.2
0.1 50.9 2.9 21.5 19.1
0.05 50.0 0.0 46.8 84.6
0.01 23.6 2.9 73.9 5.2
0.001 45.1 80.4 48.5 53.3
V. EXPERIMENTS
For training, we use a window duration D = 60s, shift S =
30s, an individual optimized kernel and ν, C values obtained
from grid search. Hence we have 25 OC-SVM and SVDD
models each profiling one user.
A. User differentiation
To test the accuracy of the learned models, each user model
is fed with the testing set of all 25 users. The ratio of accepted
windows per model is computed. Table V in Appendix A
shows the acceptance confusion matrix for all 25 OC-SVM
user models. A row represents a modelmj learned from userj
and applied to the testing sets of all users. A column represents
the testing set ti from useri fed to all user models. A cell gives
the percentage of transaction windows from useri testing set
ti accepted by the model mj from user userj .
The results show generally high self-acceptance of the
models (≥ 75%), as observed on the diagonal, while the other-
acceptance ratio is typically low. There are cases where a
significant amount of other user transactions are accepted by a
given user model, e.g. m13 with t14, t15, t16. This is expected
since occasionally different users share similar behaviors. As
the results for all users show in Tab. IV, the average self-
acceptance ratio (true positive rate) of each user model is
around 90% for both OC-SVM and SVDD while the other-
acceptance ratio (false positive rate) remains low: 7.3% for
OC-SVM and 10.7% for SVDD. This shows that the models
we built are able to differentiate tens of users communicating
on a same network.
TABLE IV
AVERAGED ACCEPTANCE RATIO TEST RESULTS FOR OC-SVM AND SVDD
USING INDIVIDUAL OPTIMIZED LEARNING PARAMETERS FOR EACH USER.
Window
duration (D) 60s 60s 10m 5m 30m 60m
shift (S) 6s 30s 1m 1m 5m 5m
ACCself 91.7 89.6 85.9 87.0 83.7 81.6
OC-SVM ACCother 7.1 7.3 5.5 6.0 4.1 4.3
ACC 84.6 82.3 80.4 81.0 79.6 77.3
ACCself 91.4 89.4 92.8 90.7 85.9 89.7
SVDD ACCother 10.4 10.7 4.5 4.1 3.6 3.6
ACC 80.9 78.7 88.3 86.5 82.3 86.1
B. User identification
In this experiment we show the capability of our model to
identify an unknown user on a given device. We aggregate web
transactions from the testing set coming from a selected host
(host-specific windowing). The obtained transaction windows
are subjected to each user model to observe those that are
accepted. We selected OC-SVM models for this experiment
since it provided a better accuracy (lower false positives) than
SVDD in Sect. V-A.
Figure 3 depicts the user identification process on 100 min-
utes of monitored web transactions from a single multi-user
device. Three users are using the device over this period: first
user1, then user23 and finally user3 as depicted by the big
squared dots in the figure, each corresponding to a transaction
window. Among the 25 tested user models, seven accepted
transaction windows, those are depicted by small dots in Fig. 3.
In general, our models accurately identify the user responsible
for an individual transaction window of 1 minute. Almost
all transaction windows from user1 are accepted only by
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Fig. 5. Speed of feature vector composition according to the number of
transactions in a 1-minute window.
her model. While some windows from user23 and user3 are
accepted by a few other user models, we see that the longest
sequences of consecutive accepted transaction windows, are
for their own model. It shows that user identification can
be performed using single 1 minute transaction windows. To
mitigate the effect of windows accepted by several models and
increase the accuracy of the identification technique, one can
consider computing a ratio of consecutive accepted windows.
This would increase though the time for user identification
from less than 1 minute for single windows to e.g. 5 minutes
if 10 consecutive transaction windows are considered.
C. Performance analysis
We timed the full classification process on a desktop ma-
chine with 16GB of RAM and Intel i5-6500@3.2GHz pro-
cessor. Figure 5 depicts the time taken for features extraction
and feature vector composition according to the count of web
transactions in the 1-minute window. The graph goes from the
observed median count of transactions in one window (54) to
its maximum (6,048). We see that the time consumed grows
linearly with the number of transactions and that it remains
below 1 second even for the biggest window we treated. Since
this computation is needed every 30 seconds (sliding factor),
it shows that this operation can be applied in real-time.
Fig. 4. Prediction time.
Once a transaction window is
computed, it is classified. Figure 4
is a box and whiskers diagram
of the classification time for one
window for OC-SVM and SVDD.
We can see that SVDD is much
faster than OC-SVM while both
of them take less than 100µs to
render a decision. SVDD uses a
less complex surface model rep-
resentation (hypersphere) than OC-SVM to split the feature
space (cf. Sect II), which explains its faster decision. Due to
the simplicity of this model, SVDD achieves slightly lower
accuracy though (cf. Sect V-A). One would have to consider
this trade-off between speed and accuracy to select either OC-
SVM or SVDD for user identification.
VI. RELATED WORK
The modeling of network communications already served
several purposes including e.g. intrusion detection [12], the
identification of Android applications usage [2], IoT de-
vices [7] or web crawlers [4]. Most proposals focus though
on modeling communications made by a single host [5], [6],
[13] i.e. associated to a given IP address. In contrast, we focus
in this paper on profiling users, which is more specific than
host profiling, since a single host can be used by several users.
Also, users exhibit more variety than applications, since a
single user uses several applications and services. To achieve
user profiling, we use web transaction logs that provide more
fine grained information than e.g. IP flow records used in
most state-of-the-art solutions [3], [5], [11], [13]. While few
other techniques rely on full packet payload analysis for traffic
modelling [12], [14], we are the first to use web transaction
logs augmented with service specific knowledge for profiling
user.
PUBCRAWL [4] uses a combination of HTTP packet head-
ers heuristics and requesting pattern analysis to distinguish
robot web crawlers from human users. They build a time
series counting the number of requests that arrive within
consecutive 30 minutes time intervals. The web crawler de-
tection algorithm uses, among other techniques, a Sample
Auto-Correlation Function where a strong auto-correlation
at small lags indicates a regular process typical of robot
crawlers. While PUBCRAWL achieves high accuracy (95%),
the binary problem of differentiating robot web crawlers from
real users is a simpler task than identifying a single user out
of many having more various and less predictable behaviors
than robots.
Pang et al. [8] addressed the profiling of single users
connected to a WiFi access point. They use 802.11 traffic
characteristics such as SSID probes or broadcast packet sizes,
which limit the application of their technique to WiFi con-
nected devices. Closer to our work is the identification of
individual users behind a NAT service using IP flow data [11].
Verde et al. extract features including the direction of a flow,
the gap between two flows, the number of packets and bytes,
etc. Multiple Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are built using
these features, each representing the communications between
a client and a single service e.g. www.youtube.com. These
learned HMMs are later used to see if a known user is
behind a monitored NATed IP address. They achieve similar
true positive rate (0.9) and false positive rate (0.08) as us. A
drawback of this method is that it discards from analysis flows
from services that were not already observed. It also requires
several days of IP flow records to identify if a user is behind
a NATed IP address.
Our profiling relying on URL information such as category,
application and media type as features, is more general and
applicable to communications with unknown services. It re-
quires only few minutes of observation to identify if a user
is using a given machine in contrast with the several hours
required by most existing solutions [3], [4], [8], [11].
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We introduced a feature representation that models se-
quences of web transactions. We showed how to use these
features to profile users with OC-SVM and SVDD. We
demonstrated an optimization method to compute user models
and assessed these models in a user differentiation and user
identification scenario using a benchmark dataset from a major
security vendor. Our results show that our technique has
90% true positive rate with a false positive rate of 7.3% in
transaction window classification. This method also shows
promises in user identification being able to identify in few
minutes which user is using a monitored device.
While the obtained accuracy and speed for single transaction
windows classification are satisfying, the false positive rate
we obtain needs to be improved. To increase the accuracy
of our method, we will explore the inference of short-time
user patterns by using only e.g. a month or a week of data
for training in order to model seasonal behaviors of users.
We plan to test other one-class classification algorithms e.g.
auto encoders, probabilistic models. When we will reach a
sufficient level of accuracy and speed, we want to develop a
system for centralized continuous authentication based on web
transaction monitoring. Such a solution could be implemented
in a company network to assess the right usage of user
accounts. We will also assess our technique on real world user
data.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE V
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR ALL OC-SVM USER MODELS. A TABLE CELL GIVES THE PERCENTAGE OF TRANSACTION WINDOWS FROM useri TESTING SET ti ACCEPTED BY THE MODEL mj FROM
userj . BOLD NUMBERS IN THE DIAGONAL REPRESENT THE SELF-ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF EACH USER.
user t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t13 t14 t15 t16 t17 t18 t19 t20 t21 t22 t23 t24 t25
m1 93.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 47.8 0.0
m2 0.0 86.8 22.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m3 0.0 0.0 75.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m4 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.0
m5 0.0 0.0 0.0 88.1 97.4 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.0
m6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 97.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.7 0.0 0.0
m7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m8 0.0 28.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m11 0.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.8 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 98.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 0.7 0.0 45.5 0.0 26.7 0.0 0.0
m12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.7 0.9 0.0
m13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.9 94.8 87.2 12.2 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5
m14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.8 94.2 74.3 11.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5
m15 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 16.8 83.5 8.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2
m16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 71.8 11.6 16.5 90.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 0.0 71.7
m17 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.9 12.1 60.6 8.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0
m18 0.0 0.0 17.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.5 0.7 2.2 3.7 0.3 0.0 85.7 8.4 0.8 0.0 50.0 51.4 22.8 0.0
m19 0.0 0.3 0.0 96.6 2.6 32.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 2.9 9.4 14.7 3.3 0.0 42.9 88.1 28.0 45.9 50.0 2.6 9.1 1.3
m20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 59.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m21 0.0 29.7 20.9 0.0 0.0 30.8 0.0 93.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 98.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 3.5 0.0 90.2 0.0 35.7 0.9 0.0
m22 0.0 12.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m23 0.0 0.0 15.0 88.1 0.0 56.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.2 3.7 0.3 0.0 57.1 10.8 0.0 0.0 50.0 88.4 75.0 0.0
m24 0.0 0.0 18.7 88.1 0.0 55.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.2 3.7 0.3 0.0 71.4 9.1 9.6 0.0 50.0 68.4 87.1 0.0
m25 0.0 12.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 80.9 27.8 98.2 98.4 100.0 0.0 1.7 9.6 45.5 50.0 0.0 0.0 92.4
